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Abstract 
This paper conducted a quantitative assessment based on a simulation analysis of what 
impact the reformed Korean National Pension Act on July 2007 could bring on its 
sustainability, equity, and adequacy, and then it inquires into policy implications for further 
development of the system. Overall, the recent reform is regarded as positive in the sense 
that efforts to prepare preemptive measures were made concerning the coming era of 
population aging by the way of financial stabilization, consolidation of pensionable right, and 
system rationalization. But, at the same time, challenges that require additional security from 
efficiency and equity perspectives still remain. In this regard, this paper suggests future 
policy agendas for resolution as follows: First, setting up a clear target for financial 
stabilization, and gradual increase of contribution rate; Second, curbing pressure from 
increasing contribution rate through improvement on pension fund management system and 
its profitability; and third, emphasizing the urgent need to raise the current earnings ceiling 
and to establish a multi-pillar old age income security system by activating corporate 
retirement pensions, private pensions, and reverse mortgages. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The speed of demographic structural changes in the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) is 
almost threatening. The lengthening of the average lifespan and retirement of baby boomers 
are expected to quadruple the number of those over 65 years old from 9.1% in 2005 to 
38.2% in 2050 (Korea National Statistical Office [KNSO] 2006). But, due to an 
unprecedented phenomenon of low birth rate, the ratio of the economically active population 
(aged 15–64) is forecasted to decrease by more than one-fourth from 71.7% to 53.0% for 
the same period. This means that the old dependency ratio is expected to rise by almost six 
times from 12.6% in 2005 to 72% in 2050 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Demographic Changes in Korea: Forecasts 
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Source: KNSO (2006) 
A rapidly aging population will make old age income security more important, while at the 
same time, significantly affecting public pension finance. In this regard, Korea now faces two 
major policy challenges—that of improving the old age income security system as soon as 
possible and, at the same time, improving the financial sustainability of the public pension 
system. These two policies, however, could potentially clash. For example, in the case of 
overemphasizing the function of public pension social insurance, a rapidly aging population 
could undermine the system’s sustainability. On the other hand, if Korea focused mainly on 
stabilizing pension finance, its function for old age income security could weaken. 
To accomplish these two policy goals, it would not be appropriate to depend on a single 
method, and efforts to develop various income sources for the elderly are needed. In other 
words, a more advanced old age income security system should be established by 
harmoniously developing various methods, such as national public pension, retirement 
pension at the corporate level, private pensions at the individual level, and savings for after 
retirement. It is also necessary to streamline the function of public pension adequately 
through the establishment of complementing systems and operating the system in a 
financially stable manner. 
The National Pension Scheme, which serves as the backbone of Korea’s public pension 
system, was first implemented in 1988. The scheme started to be extensively applied in 
1999 to include self-employed people in urban areas, establishing a framework for the full-
scale National Pension Scheme. Despite this external growth, however, the National 
Pension Scheme had a serious structural problem, specifically, on the imbalance between 
generous benefits and low contribution rates since its introduction. 
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To resolve this “low contribution-high benefit” discrepancy, the first amendment to the 
National Pension Act was done in 1998. At that time, the original revised bill included a 
decrease in the average income replacement rate for insured people with 40 years of 
coverage from 70% to 55%, extension of the age entitled to receive the first pension benefits 
to 65, and adoption of the actuarial valuation (conducted every five years, starting in 2003), 
while maintaining the basic framework of the previous unified pension scheme. However, as 
the bill went through a political decision process at the National Assembly, the proposed 
income replacement rate was adjusted to 60% from 55% and the overall contents failed to 
meet the original goal of the amendment. 
As a result, according to the actuarial valuation conducted in 2003, which was done less 
than five years after the first revision, a pension deficit would occur by 2036, and the pension 
fund would completely be exhausted by 2047 (National Pension Development Committee 
[NPDC] 2003). Accordingly, the long-term financial instability of the National Pension 
Scheme became a serious issue again, damaging the confidence of pensioners on the 
government’s pension plan. To respond to the situation, the government submitted a second 
revised bill for the National Pension Scheme in 2003 containing measures to strengthen the 
financial stability of the fund and to ensure the substantiality of various systems, including 
the permanent establishment of a fund management committee. This bill, however, was not 
passed until July 2007, some four years after it had been presented to the National 
Assembly, with a somewhat reduced scale of changes from what had been originally 
submitted. 
In this study, the expected effects and limitations of the second amendment to the National 
Pension Act are assessed and the political implications reviewed. To this end, various 
simulation methods have been used to quantitatively analyze the impact of the second 
amendment on the financial sustainability of the National Pension Scheme, intergenerational 
and intragenerational equity, and the scheme’s adequacy as an old age income source. 
Based on the results of my analyses, additional tasks for the sustainable and efficient 
development of the National Pension Scheme are suggested. 
The contents of this study are as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the major contents of 
the amendment to the National Pension Act. Section 3 outlines the quantitative assessment 
of the effect of the revision through various simulation analyses. Based on the assessment 
results, Section 4 presents policy tasks that should be focused on for the improvement of the 
National Pension Scheme in the future. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a summary of 
major analysis results and policy implications. 
2. MAJOR CONTENTS OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE 
NATIONAL PENSION ACT 
Korea’s National Pension Scheme faces long-term financial instability and intergenerational 
inequity problems due to an imbalance in the benefit-contribution structure and a rapidly 
aging population. As a result, the need to reform the existing actuarial valuation process, 
which was first carried out in 2003, has emerged once again. To secure the financial stability 
and expand the coverage of the pension scheme, the government had long been pursuing 
another amendment to the National Pension Act since 2003. The National Assembly, 
however, did not pass the revised bill until July 2007. 
The government’s second reform plan for the National Pension Scheme was composed of 
“parametric” reform measures that can alleviate the financial imbalance through an 
adjustment of benefit and contribution levels, while maintaining the structural framework of 
the existing scheme, much like the first reform. More specifically, the financial stabilization 
measures of the second amendment included a decrease in the benefit level based on 
average income earners with 40 years coverage from 60% to 50% by 2008, and then further 
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progressive decreases by 0.5 percentage points per year down to 40% in 2028, while 
maintaining the same 9% contribution rate. In addition, in a way to rationalize and 
complement the National Pension Scheme, the government also included the introduction of 
the Military Service Credit System, which was designed to grant six months’ coverage to a 
person who has successfully finished his/her military service, and the Childbirth Credit 
System, designed to grant additional coverage to women who give birth to more than two 
children. The Deferred Pension System was drawn up to encourage the elderly to engage in 
income-earning activities. The other amendments include: (i) a decrease in benefit payment 
rates for each age group of early old age pensioners; (ii) an increase in the scale of the 
benefit cuts to prevent early retirement; (iii) an improvement of the Concurrent Benefits 
Adjustment System1; (iv) the prohibition of the seizure of paid pensions; (v) continuous 
payment of the Divided Pension, which is originally paid to a divorced spouse, even after a 
beneficiary remarries; and (vi) the expansion of the scope of beneficiaries for the 
Dependents’ Pension. Table 1 summarizes the major contents of the amendment to the 
National Pension Act. 
Table 1: Major Contents of the Amendment to the National Pension Act 
Major Contents of the Amendment Before Amendment After Amendment 
Long-term 
financial 
stabilization 
measures  
Contribution rate 9% of average monthly 
income 
same  
Income 
replacement rate 
Average income 
replacement rate based on 
insured people with 40 
years of coverage:* 
1988–1997: 70%  
1998–2007: 60% 
2008: 50%; 2009–2028: Decrease 
by 0.5 percentage points per year; 
After 2028: 40% 
Measures to 
rationalize and 
complement the 
National Pension 
Scheme 
Abatement Old 
Age Pension 
Additional 2.5% abatement 
rate applied to pensioners 
with less than 10–20 year 
coverage: 
47.5% (2010)–92.5% 
(2019) 
Abolishment of additional reduction 
rate: 50% (2010)–95% (2019) 
Early Old Age 
Pension 
- Applicable 5 years before 
the normal benefit 
payment age, which is 
currently 55 
- Decrease by 5% of the 
benefit amount per year 
for the period of early 
payment  
Upward adjustment of the 
abatement rate per year for the 
duration of early payment (5 
percentage points to 6 percentage 
points) 
                                                
1 When a pensioner has the rights to two or more benefits, only one benefit is allowed at his/her choice. 
However, in case of a survivor pension, the amendment allowed a fixed amount to be added to the amount 
of the chosen pension. 
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Major Contents of the Amendment Before Amendment After Amendment 
Incentives for 
inducing early old 
age pensioners to 
engage in 
income-earning 
activities  
- Suspension of benefit 
payment if beneficiaries 
engage in income-
generating activities 
- Application of Early Old 
Age Pension to people 
aged over 60 
- Suspension of benefit payment if 
pensioners generate income 
- Application of the Active Old Age 
Pension to workers aged 60 and 
above 
- Increase in benefit payment rate 
for the period of re-subscription 
(6% per year for the re-
subscription period)  
Deferred Pension 
System  
None - Payment of increased benefit 
when beneficiaries, who reach 
the pension age, defer the 
receipt of pension  
- Additional rate: 0.5 percentage 
points per month (6 percentage 
points per year) 
Military Service 
Credit System 
None When a person has successfully 
finished his/her military service, an 
additional insured period (6 months) 
is granted to the person  
Childbirth Credit 
System 
None When a person gives birth to more 
than two children, an additional 
insured period (up to 50 months) is 
granted to one of the children’s 
parents 
Measures to 
expand the 
pension 
coverage 
Introduction of 
Basic Old Age 
Pension System 
None - Expansion of the scope of 
beneficiaries: from 60% to 70% 
of the elderly population aged 65 
and over  
- Increase in benefit rate: from 5% 
to 10% of average earnings of 
total national pensioners by 2028 
Source: Press Release from the Ministry of Health & Welfare (2007) 
* Based on the amount of monthly benefit in the first year of pension payment against the recalculated average 
lifelong earnings of middle-income earners 
Together with these reform measures, the noncontributory Basic Old Age Pension Act was 
introduced to expand the pension coverage among elderly people with low incomes. Under 
this act, the benefit payment that comes to about 5% of the average monthly income (Value 
A) is provided for people aged over 65 with an income lower than the basic income 
determined by the Presidential Decree issued in January 2008. The benefit level, however, 
will be adjusted gradually from 5% of Value A to 10% by 2028, while the scope of its 
beneficiaries will be expanded from the current 60% of the people older than 65 (as of 1 July 
2008 at its first benefit payment) to 70% by January 2009.  
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3. ASSESSMENT OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL 
PENSION ACT 
As mentioned above, the amendment to the National Pension Act is highly likely to bring 
considerable change in the contribution-benefit structure of the National Pension Scheme as 
it contains a fairly large number of benefit cuts, an introduction to the Basic Old Age Pension 
System, and the rationalization of the related benefit level. To assess such effects of the 
revised act, a multifaceted review is necessary, one which covers the various aspects of 
both pension finance and the social security function. In this context, Section 3 shows the 
results of estimating the effects of the revision by analyzing the long-term sustainability of 
the National Pension Scheme, equity among different generations and income classes, 
adequacy of the benefit level, and responsiveness to changes in social environments.2  In 
particular, in assessing the effects on each sector, various simulation methods have been 
used for quantitative analysis. 
3.1 Sustainability 
The purpose of the amendment to the National Pension Act is to obtain long-term financial 
stability of the National Pension Scheme in preparation for an aged society. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to prioritize the evaluation of how much the National Pension Act’s amendment 
can contribute to the enhancement of the sustainability of the scheme. To analyze the 
impact of the amendment and to reflect the unique conditions of Korea’s National Pension 
Scheme, this study used the long-term Actuarial Projection Model, a customized form of the 
World Bank’s Pension Reform Options Software Toolkit (PROST) Model. Also, KNSO’s 
population-related statistics were used as the basis for the analysis.3 
In this actuarial projection, the most important economic variables are the assumptions over 
the wage growth rate, the interest rate, and the economic growth rate. The assumed values 
should be set up in full consideration of the dynamic relationship among these variables 
because their relationship plays a pivotal role in the assessment of the cash-flow projection 
as well as the actuarial evaluation. In this study, actual data were used to analyze the period 
between 1988 and 2007, while assumed values for real economic growth rate, real wage 
growth rate, and real interest rate were used for the future period (up to 2050). These values 
were calculated based on the Growth Accounting Method presented in the study by Han et 
al. (2006).4 Figure 2 presents the assumed values of such economic variables. 
                                                
2 This study focuses on the assessment and analysis of financial stabilization measures among various reform 
measures for the National Pension Act. For more information about the assessment results of the 
improvement measures for the working elderly, including the introduction of Deferred Pension System and 
Early Old Age Pension System, refer to Moon and Lee (2007). 
3 For more specific information on the actuarial evaluation process of the National Pension Scheme, refer to 
Moon and Shim (2005). 
4 Due to the difference in assumed values, the actuarial projection result for the National Pension Scheme 
presented in this study could be different from that of existing studies or the National Pension Service’s 
statistics. 
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Figure 2: Prospects for the Time Serial Changes in Major Economic Indices 
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Source: Han et al. (2006) 
In long-term actuarial projections, it is necessary to differentiate the concepts of interest rate 
and rate of return on the pension fund to generate more accurate results. In fact, in a funded 
pension scheme, the pension fund’s rate of return will have a direct impact on the pension 
finance, and the assumed value of the rate of return is not necessarily equal to the assumed 
interest rate value. That is, the return rate of the pension fund can be differentiated, 
depending on how efficient the fund management is or how strategically the assets are 
allocated. However, it is also difficult to make an assumption that there will be a constant 
gap between the return rate of the fund and the presumed interest rate. Therefore, this study 
has set an underlying assumption that the national pension fund’s return rate is equal to the 
assumed value of the interest rate, following the universal rule. However, in the latter part of 
this study that covers policy discussions, different values were used to analyze the impact on 
the pension finance when the fund’s rate of return is different from the assumed interest rate.  
Under this assumption, Table 2 shows the results of comparing the financial prospects for 
the pension fund before and after the amendment of the National Pension Fund Act. As 
shown in Table 2, the instability of the pension finance is expected to be alleviated 
considerably in the long-term due to the second financial stabilization measures introduced 
in 2007. More specifically, with the stabilization measures implemented, the financial deficit 
of the pension fund is likely to occur in 2035, 10 years later than the previously expected 
point of time. Also, under the assumption that there will be no additional institutional 
changes, the point of time when the fund runs out of money will be postponed by 15 years 
from 2045 to 2060. Moreover, the ratio of fund reserve amount to gross domestic product 
(GDP) is likely to reach 46.2% by 2035, while the speed of decrease in the fund size is 
expected to slow down after the amendment. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Financial Prospects before and after the Amendment 
(Unit: trillion KRW, %) 
  
 Total Revenue 
Total 
Expenditures 
Account 
Balance 
Reserve 
Necessary Contribution 
Rate (%) 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
2005 
30.2 30.2 3.2 3.2 27.0 27.0 173.0 173.0 
9.0 9.0 
(3.5) (3.5) (0.4) (0.4) (3.1) (3.1) (20.1) (20.1) 
2010 
50.7 50.7 8.1 7.6 42.6 43.1 353.7 357.3 
9.0 9.0 
(4.0) (4.0) (0.6) (0.6) (3.3) (3.4) (27.7) (27.9) 
2015 
79.9 80.4 17.6 15.5 62.3 64.9 625.3 638.4 
9.0 9.0 
(4.3) (4.3) (1.0) (0.8) (3.4) (3.5) (33.8) (34.5) 
2020 
117.1 119.1 39.3 30.5 77.8 88.6 988.8 1,031.9
9.0 9.0 
(4.5) (4.6) (1.5) (1.2) (3.0) (3.4) (37.8) (39.4) 
2025 
160.6 167.8 78.7 57.9 82.0 109.9 1,397.6 1,535.0
9.0 9.0 
(4.5) (4.7) (2.2) (1.6) (2.3) (3.1) (39.2) (43.1) 
2030 
206.2 225.5 143.2 101.3 63.0 124.2 1,761.8 2,124.1
9.0 9.0 
(4.4) (4.8) (3.1) (2.2) (1.3) (2.7) (37.7) (45.5) 
2035 
242.1 285.7 236.4 163.5 5.7 122.2 1,924.1 2,748.8
9.0 9.0 
(4.1) (4.8) (4.0) (2.7) (0.1) (2.1) (32.3) (46.2) 
2040 
259.9 348.3 376.9 258.1 -116.9 90.2 1,619.6 3,298.9
9.0 9.0 
(3.5) (4.7) (5.0) (3.5) (-1.6) (1.2) (21.7) (44.1) 
2045 
237.3 403.0 553.8 377.3 -316.5 25.6 478.4 3,613.3
9.0 9.0 
(2.6) (4.3) (6.0) (4.1) (-3.4) (0.3) (5.1) (38.9) 
2050 
234.4 443.6 772.8 524.9 -538.4 -81.2 - 3,488.9
29.7 9.0 
(2.0) (3.8) (6.7) (4.5) (-4.7) (-0.7)  (30.2) 
2055 
284.4 454.1 992.2 672.5 -707.8 -218.4 - 2,781.5
31.4 9.0 
(2.0) (3.2) (6.9) (4.7) (-4.9) (-1.5)  (19.4) 
2060 
346.4 424.5 1,295.8 876.6 -949.5 -452.1 - 1,131.2
33.7 9.0 
(1.9) (2.4) (7.3) (4.9) (-5.3) (-2.5)  (6.3) 
2065 
425.5 425.5 1,671.4 1,128.5 -1,246.0 -703.0 - - 
35.4 23.9 
(1.9) (1.9) (7.5) (5.1) (-5.6) (-3.2)   
2070 
525.1 525.1 2,101.1 1,415.3 -1,576.0 -890.2  - 
36.0 24.3 
(1.9) (1.9) (7.6) (5.1) (-5.7) (-3.2)   
Note: The values in parentheses are ratios to GDP. 
Therefore, it is estimated that the amendment to the National Pension Act has considerably 
improved the sustainability of the pension finance through the decrease in benefit levels and 
significantly alleviated the structural imbalance between pension benefits and contributions 
at the same time. In particular, such a gradual decrease in the average income replacement 
rate based on insured people with 40 years of coverage by 20 percentage points (from 60% 
to 40%) is not only substantial, it is also meaningful that this adjustment has been applied at 
the initial stage of the system implementation. Nevertheless, the financial stabilization 
measures do not seem to be sufficient for fundamentally changing the “high benefit-low 
contribution” structure of the National Pension Scheme and achieving the actuarial balance 
of the pension fund. As shown in the projection results, the gap between pension benefits 
and contributions still remains despite a huge decrease in benefit expenditure in the long 
term (a 2.5 percentage point decrease against the projected GDP value in 2070). 
As a result, it seems inevitable that the pension fund will be exhausted by 2060 if the current 
contribution rate stays at the same level. After that, the financial system will have to be 
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replaced by the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. In this case, however, the contribution 
burden on the workers of future generations will become much heavier. As shown in Table 2, 
the per capita contribution rate of economically active people after the conversion to the 
PAYG system is expected to surge from current 9% to 23.9% by 2065, and to 24.3% by 
2070. That is, compared to the situation where the National Pension Scheme continues to 
have the current partially funded system, not only will the future workers have to bear the 
burden of over 1.5 times higher contribution payments (refer to Section 4 for more 
information), but also they will receive benefits far less valuable than the present value of 
what they have paid, which will inevitably cause an excessive income transfer from next 
generations to current generations in the future. 
To analyze the role of the National Pension Act’s second amendment in alleviating the 
fundamental imbalance of the pension scheme and its limitations, it seems more reasonable 
to conduct the actuarial valuation of the National Pension Scheme using a “closed measure.” 
Table 3 and Figure 4 present the calculation results of the changes in the scale of total 
pension liability and total reserve for losses, using the “projected benefit obligation” (PBO) 
method. In Table 3, the “unfunded actuarial liability” (UAL) means the difference between 
total pension liability and actual fund reserve while the funding ratio is the ratio of fund 
reserve to the total pension liability. Therefore, in the case of using a fully funded pension 
scheme, the UAL value becomes zero (funding rate will be 1.0), while in the case of using 
the PAYG, the UAL value will be equal to the total reserve for loss. 
Table 3: Actuarial Assessment before and after the Amendment to  
the National Pension Act (Unit: trillion KRW, %) 
 
Pension Reserve (A)  Total Pension Liability(B) 
Unfunded Actuarial 
Liability (UAL) 
(B-A) 
Funding Ratio 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
2005 
173 173.0 451 323.2 278 150.1 
38.4 53.5 
(20.1) (20.1) (52.2) (37.5) (32.2) (17.4) 
2010 
354 357.3 801 569.7 448 212.4 
44.1 62.7 
(27.7) (27.9) (62.7) (44.6) (35.0) (16.6) 
2015 
625 638.4 1,320 928.6 694 290.1 
47.4 68.8 
(33.8) (34.5) (71.2) (50.1) (37.5) (15.7) 
2020 
989 1,031.9 2,071 1,430.4 1,082 398.5 
47.7 72.1 
(37.8) (39.4) (79.1) (54.6) (41.3) (15.2) 
2025 
1,398 1,535.0 3,110 2,138.9 1,712 604.0 
44.9 71.8 
(39.2 (43.1) (87.3) (60.0) (48.1) (17.0) 
2030 
1,762 2,124.1 4,221 2,891.7 2,459 767.6 
41.7 73.5 
(37.7) (45.5) (90.4) (61.9) (52.7) (16.4) 
2035 
1,924 2,748.8 5,782 3,940.0 3,858 1,191.2 
33.3 69.8 
(32.3) (46.2) (97.2) (66.2) (64.8) (20.0) 
2040 
1,620 3,298.9 7,846 5,342.5 6,226 2,043.7 
20.6 61.7 
(21.7) (44.1) (104.9) (71.5) (83.3) (27.3) 
2045 
478 3,613.3 10,853 7,386.4 10,374 3,773.1 
4.4 48.9 
(5.1) (38.9) (116.7) (79.4) (111.6) (40.6) 
2050 
- 3,488.9 14,504 9,865.3 14,504 6,376.4 
- 35.4 
 (30.2) (125.5) (85.4) (125.5) (55.2) 
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Pension Reserve (A)  Total Pension Liability(B) 
Unfunded Actuarial 
Liability (UAL) 
(B-A) 
Funding Ratio 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
2055 
- 2,781.5 18,351 12,473.9 18,351 9,692.4 
- 22.3 
 (19.4) (127.8) (86.8) (127.8) (67.5) 
2060 
- 1,131.2 23,645 16,050.8 23,645 14,919.6 
- 7.2 
 (6.3) (132.5) (89.9) (132.5) (83.6) 
2065 
- - 30,765 20,845.3 30,765 20,845.3 
- - 
  (138.7) (94.0) (138.7) (94.0) 
2070 
- - 39,550 26,754.1 39,550 26,754.1 - - 
  (143.5) (97.1) (143.5) (97.1)
As observed in Table 3, with the amendment to the National Pension Scheme, the size of 
UAL is expected to be reduced considerably from 278 trillion won in 2005 (pre-amendment 
period) to 150 trillion won (post-amendment period). The reason this UAL value decreases 
with the reform is because the PBO method considers the future subscription period of 
current pensioners in calculating the amount of total pension liability. That is, if the benefit 
rate for the future subscription period decreases with the amendment, the average payment 
rate over total subscription period will also decrease, which, in turn, will have an impact on 
the size of the past service liability. As a result, the funding rate is estimated to have 
increased from 38% before the amendment to 53.5% after the amendment, which will 
considerably improve the actuarial imbalance. 
Despite such improvement, however, the ratio of the UAL to GDP is likely to increase 
continuously after 2030 and reach 100% around 2070. The funding ratio will also plunge 
after it reaches its peak rate—over 70%—by 2035. This implies that the actuarial imbalance 
of the National Pension Scheme still remains and it will actually be aggravated as the 
pension system enters a mature stage and population aging accelerates. Therefore, to strike 
a more fundamental financial balance for the National Pension Scheme, it seems necessary 
to make an upward adjustment of the current contribution level, or additional decrease in 
pension benefit within a short time frame. 
The financial stabilization measures included in the revised bill for the National Pension Act, 
which was recently passed in the National Assembly, is different from what was originally 
submitted by the government in 2003, both in terms of pension benefit and contribution 
levels. Originally, the government planned to decrease the benefit level (average income 
replacement rate) from 60% to 50% and gradually increase the contribution rate from 9% to 
15.9%, based on the results of the first actuarial valuation carried out in 2003. This conforms 
to the financial stabilization goal of keeping the reserve ratio of the pension fund at a level 
higher than 200% by 2070 (NPDC 2003).5 Despite some criticisms over the stabilization goal 
itself, the original plan can be positively viewed as progress, in that it set a specific goal for 
financial stabilization, unlike the pension reform in 1998, and attempted to fundamentally 
adjust the imbalanced benefit-contribution structure.6 
However, core contents of the government’s original revised bill were drastically changed 
during the four years of adjustment process at the National Assembly. That is, while the 
average income replacement rate was reduced to 40% in the long term to complement the 
                                                
5 Reserve ratio is defined as the ratio of fund reserve to the annual expenditure. 
6 Refer to Moon (2005) for the critical assessment focusing on problems and limitations of the 2003 revised bill of 
the National Pension Act. 
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adoption of the Basic Old Age Pension System, the contribution level was determined to be 
maintained at the existing level, considering the possible opposition and resistance from 
participants. However, because this adjustment was the result of political compromise 
without a full reflection of the specific financial goals for the long-term stabilization of the 
pension finance, the adjustment caused a repeat of the stopgap situation where measures 
were taken only to respond to the problems rather than fix the source of the problems, just 
like during the process for the first amendment to the National Pension Act in 1998. In this 
context, it seems an objective assessment to say that the long-term financial stabilization 
measures under the second amendment were only half successful. 
3.2 Equity 
To evaluate the effect of the amendment to the National Pension Act in terms of equity, it 
would be useful to differentiate equity among different income classes and the equity among 
different generations, and then analyze specifically how much the amendment has affected 
the value of the benefit by income class and by generation. In this study, the changes in the 
benefit values by generation and by income class before and after the amendment have 
been compared through an actuarial simulation method. Following are the assumptions and 
major variables used in the simulation analysis. 
3.2.1 Simulation Procedures 
In this study, sample subscribers were classified by age group and income class. By age 
group, single male workers at ages 55, 40, and 25 as of 2008 were selected while each 
income class was composed of pensioners with incomes of 1/3, 1/2, and 2 times the basic 
income level, respectively. The basic income level was calculated based on the average 
income of economically active people by each age group and the average income was 
calculated based on the data from the 2005 Basic Statistical Survey of Benefit Structure 
(Ministry of Labor 2005). More specifically, each average income of male workers at age of 
52, 37, and 22 were set as 3,096,366 KRW; 2,940,189 KRW; and 1,180,269 KRW, 
respectively. Also, it was presumed that all the workers started to subscribe to the National 
Pension Scheme at age 25 and would continue to work until they reach the entitlement age 
and can receive pension benefits without any withdrawal from the subscription in the middle 
of the subscription period. 
In this analysis, calculation of the pension benefits amounts after the retirement of the 
sample subscribers required not only their annual earnings level but also an assumption of 
the change in their income level as they grew older. That is, to draw up an “age-earnings 
profile” over the entire working period for each worker, additional assumptions are necessary 
for the “general rate of promotion” reflecting the increase in age and working period as well 
as the average wage growth rate. In this study, the general rate of promotion was calculated 
based on the “curve-fitting” value of the average income distribution in the statistical data of 
the Ministry of Labor. Then, the calculated rate has been equally applied to all age groups 
under the assumption that the distribution pattern will remain constant in the future. 
However, since the objects in this analysis were presumed to work continuously until they 
start to receive pension benefits, it has also been assumed that there will be no changes in 
the income level after they reach 50 in the virtual age-earning profile.7 
Furthermore, it was necessary to adjust the contribution and benefit levels of each 
generation using the “death rate by age” as a weight, in order to estimate the size of the 
expected benefit value. However, due to limited data on the survival probability of each 
generation for this study, the benefit value was calculated based on the expected years of 
life, presuming that each pensioner lives until 55, which is the entitlement age for the current 
                                                
7 For more in-depth information about the analysis procedures, refer to Moon and Lee (2007). 
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Early Old Age Pension. The expected years of life were calculated based on the KNSO’s 
2005 Complete Life-Table (by generation). The calculation result shows that the life 
expectancy of male workers aged 55 as of 2008 is 78.5, while those aged 40 and 25 as of 
2008 are 80.5 and 82.5, respectively, revealing a continuous increase in the pensionable 
service period over time. 
As for the institutional variables, the effect of the amendment to the National Pension Act 
has been analyzed through a comparison between the periods before and after the 
amendment in July 2007. For this analysis, it has also been reflected that the starting age 
eligible to receive the benefit of the Basic Old Age Pension will gradually go up from the 
current 60 to 65 by 2033. In calculating the pension benefit level by each pensioner, the 
function of income redistribution of the national pension should be considered. That is, 
because the current scheme is composed equally of the “earnings-related portion” which is 
based on the recalculated average life-time earnings (Value B) of individual pensioners and 
the “fixed portion” estimated based on the average earnings of the last three years during 
the pensionable service period (Value A), an assumption for calculating Value A is also 
necessary. Therefore, it has been assumed in this study that Value A increases in 
accordance with the real wage growth rate of each year from 1,412,428 KRW, the actual 
average earnings value in 2005. 
In the application of contribution value, it has been assumed that workers pay the total 
amount of the contribution because the employers’ share of the contribution payment will 
ultimately be transferred to workers through a decrease in the amount of real wage. The 
contribution rate has been assumed to be 3% by 1992 after the introduction of the National 
Pension Scheme, 6% between 1993 and 1997, and 9% after 1998. Also, as for the values of 
real wage growth rate and real interest rate, which are playing a critical role in the actuarial 
profitability assessment, the same values used in the previous actuarial projection have 
been used in this analysis as well. Finally, all the price variables used in this analysis are 
based on the constant price in 2005. 
3.2.2 Results 
Table 4 demonstrates the major indices that show the changes in benefit values before and 
after the amendment to the National Pension Act, analyzed through a simulation under the 
above assumptions and conditions. The equity effect of the amendment could be analyzed 
by calculating the difference in the net value of pension benefits by each age group and 
income class between pre- and post-implementation periods. Table 4 presents the internal 
rate of return (IRR) and “benefit-to-contribution ratio”; i.e., the ratio of the present value of 
the expected pension benefits to total contribution payment, which is the basis of the 
calculation. 
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Table 4: Changes in the Benefit Level before and after the Amendment 
(Unit: 1,000 KRW, times, %) 
a. Single male workers aged 55 as of 2008 
       Income Level 
 
1/3 of the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners 
1/2 of the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Average Income 
Earners  
Twice as Much 
as the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Before After Before After Before After Before  After 
Pension Benefits (B) 694 666 828 794 1,230 1,180 1,375 1,318 
Average Lifetime Income 
(y) 
1,377 1,377 2,065 2,065 4,130 4,130 8,713 8,713 
Income Replacement 
Rate (B/y) 
50.38 48.37 40.09 38.46 29.79 28.56 15.79 15.13 
Benefit/Contribution 
Ratio 
(After/Before Ratio) 
3.35 
 
3.22 
(96.1) 
2.67 
 
2.56 
(95.9) 
1.98 
 
1.90 
(96.0) 
1.89 
 
1.82 
(96.3) 
Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) 
10.59 10.37 9.34 9.11 7.71 7.48 7.46 7.23 
b. Single male workers aged 40 as of 2008  
       Income Level 
 
1/3 of the Level 
of Average 
Income Earners
1/2 of the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Average Income 
Earners  
Twice as Much as 
the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Pension Benefits (B) 1,744 1,473 2,075 1,751 3,069 2,586 3,696 3,112 
Average Lifetime Income 
(y) 
2,266 2,266 3,399 3,399 6,799 6,799 14,790 14,790 
Income Replacement 
Rate (B/y) 
76.94 64.98 61.04 51.51 45.15 38.04 24.99 21.04 
Benefit/Contribution Ratio 
(After/Before Ratio) 
3.03 
 
2.56 
(84.5) 
2.41 
 
2.03 
(84.2) 
1.78 
 
1.50 
(84.3) 
1.64 
 
1.38 
(84.1) 
IRR  7.70 7.06 6.82 6.17 5.66 4.99 5.30 4.65 
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c. Single male workers aged 25 as of 2008 
       Income Level 
 
1/3 of the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners 
1/2 of the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Same as the Level 
of Average Income 
Earners  
Twice as Much 
as the Level of 
Average Income 
Earners  
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Pension Benefits (B) 2,711 1,926 3,250 2,309 4,868 3,458 5,784 4,109 
Average Lifetime Income 
(y) 
3,595 3,595 5,393 5,393 10,786 10,786 23,532 23,532 
Income Replacement 
Rate (B/y) 
75.40 53.57 60.27 42.81 45.13 32.06 24.58 17.46 
Benefit/Contribution 
Ratio 
(After/Before Ratio) 
2.73 
 
1.94 
(71.1) 
2.18 
 
1.55 
(71.1) 
1.64 
 
1.16 
(70.7) 
1.51 
 
1.08 
(71.5) 
IRR  6.98 5.75 6.18 4.93 5.12 3.85 4.77 3.55 
3.2.2.1 Intragenerational Equity 
First, in terms of the benefit-to-contribution ratio, there is a big difference in the net pension 
values of the old National Pension Scheme among different income classes, reflecting the 
income redistribution effect of the “fixed portion” of the scheme. For example, in the case of 
workers aged 55 years as of 2008, the total benefit of average income earners is expected 
to be about twice the amount of their total contribution payment for 21 years based on the 
present value, implying that the existing National Pension Scheme has a serious imbalance 
between “high benefit and low contribution.” Meanwhile, the benefit-to-contribution ratio of 
the workers with 1/3 of the average income level is 3.4, meaning that the lower the income, 
the bigger the gap between the present values of contribution and benefit.8 
In Table 4, the benefit-to-contribution ratio of the workers who earn twice as much as 
average workers is not much lower than that of the average income earners, because there 
is a ceiling on the pensionable income (currently 3.6 million KRW). Nevertheless, in the case 
of the workers aged 55 as of 2008, the first generation of the National Pension Scheme, the 
benefit-to-contribution ratio for the high-income class is about 1.9, much higher than the 
actuarial balance level, where the benefit-to-contribution ratio is 1.0. This structural 
imbalance is also revealed in the calculation result of internal rate of return. For example, in 
the case of the 55-year-old age group, the real IRR of the income class with one-half of the 
average income level, which is similar to middle-income subscribers in the National Pension 
Scheme, is estimated to be over 9%. This is more than twice the level of the real interest 
rate or the real rate of return on the Pension Fund, meaning that the benefit level for the 
early generation of the scheme is relatively too high in terms of actuarial value.  
In this second amendment to the National Pension Act, as a downward adjustment has been 
uniformly applied to all benefit levels, the cutting ratios in different income classes are almost 
proportional. Therefore, it seems possible to assess the impact of the amendment on the 
equity among different income classes as “relatively neutral.” Such proportional effect of the 
benefit cut is also observed in the 40-year-old age group and 25-year-old age group. 
However, considering the fact that the newly introduced Basic Old Age Pension benefit will 
be paid to elderly people who fall in the lowest six income deciles, the overall income 
redistribution capacity of the National Pension Scheme could be strengthened further. 
                                                
8 In this simulation, the income level of average workers is a little above twice the level of Value A. Therefore, in 
terms of income level, the middle-income subscribers of the National Pension Scheme are similar to those 
who earn half the level of average workers’ income. 
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Despite the benefit cuts, the benefit-to-contribution ratio of workers aged 55 is still very high 
in every income class. This is so because, in the context of protecting the vested interests of 
existing pensioners, the benefit level under the old act will be guaranteed for the previous 
subscription period and the decrease in pension benefits will occur gradually over a long 
period of time. Therefore, in the case of workers aged 55 as of 2008, the benefit-to-
contribution ratio is likely to fall only by about 4% in all income classes. However, the 
decrease in benefit-to-contribution ratios is expected to grow bigger for the future 
generations.  
3.2.2.2 Intergenerational Equity 
The gap of net pension benefit values among different generations under the National 
Pension Scheme and the effect of the amendment to the National Pension Act could be 
assessed through a comparison of benefit-to-contribution ratios and IRR among different 
age groups. Table 4 shows the benefit-to-contribution ratios and IRR of three age groups: 
55, 40, and 25. Under the existing pension scheme, these two values seem to decrease 
further with future generations due to the first reform measure to cut the benefits in 1998. 
However, as seen in Table 4, the benefit-to-cost ratio of the national pension is above 1.0 in 
every age group and income class, implying that the net pension benefit is applied to all of 
the current pensioners. In other words, the old National Pension Scheme contained a very 
serious problem of a structural imbalance. 
The second amendment to the National Pension Act is expected to cause a considerable 
change in the benefit level by each age group. As presented in Table 4, the extent of 
decrease in the benefit-to-contribution ratio of workers aged 55 as of 2008 is only 4% for 
each income class, while that of workers aged 40 and 25 is about 16% and 29%, 
respectively. As a result, the gap of benefit-to-contribution ratios between average income 
earners aged 55 and those aged 25 increased from 17.2% (1.98 and 1.64 for age group 55 
and 25, respectively) before the amendment to 38.8% (1.90 and 1.16 for age group 55 and 
25, respectively) after the amendment. This is, of course, due to the effect of benefit cuts 
under the amendment occurring slowly, which in turn, is the result of grandfathering over the 
past subscription period and a gradual decrease in the level of future benefits. 
As noted above, the study suggests that the gap of net pension benefits among different age 
groups gets wider with the amendment to the National Pension Act. However, this should not 
be interpreted that the amendment has a negative impact on intergenerational equity. As 
presented above, under the existing scheme, the conversion to PAYG system will inevitably 
increase the contribution rates of future generations to over 30%. However, it is important to 
note that the second amendment to the act cuts the net pension benefits of early 
generations, thereby lessening the burden of contribution payment for future generations. 
That is, since such a result inevitably occurs during the accrual period due to the 
grandfathering measure, from a long-term perspective, the amendment to the National 
Pension Act will have to be assessed to have enhanced the intergenerational equity by 
alleviating the structural imbalance of the National Pension Scheme. 
Meanwhile, the benefit-to-contribution ratios of all age groups and income classes exceed 
the system balance level (1.0) even after the amendment to the National Pension Act, which 
indicates that all of the current pensioners are likely to receive considerable net pension 
benefits. Of course, there is a possibility that the benefit-to-contribution ratios of some high-
income earners will fall below 1.0, in case the objects of actuarial projection include more 
generations in the future. However, even considering this, the structural imbalance of the 
National Pension Scheme will continue to exist after the amendment. Therefore, additional 
measures to rectify remaining structural imbalance should be followed to improve 
intergenerational equity. In particular, additional increase in pension contribution should be 
promptly applied for the enhancement of financial stabilization and equity among different 
generations. 
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3.2.2.3 Adequacy 
Adequacy is an assessment standard used to estimate whether the revised National 
Pension Scheme will play a sufficient role in terms of old age income security. However, the 
adequacy of such old age income replacement level should be judged in consideration not 
only of the single-layered National Pension Scheme but also of the multilayered other 
pension plans including retirement pension at the company level, private pension at the 
individual level, and savings for old age. Also, the replacement level of proper old age 
income will differ depending on the type of family, health status, or whether or not there are 
any other income sources for the pensioners. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest an absolute 
assessment standard to evaluate the adequacy of the National Pension Scheme. The 
adequacy level should be assessed indirectly by calculating how the income replacement 
rate of the National Pension Scheme has changed before and after the amendment. 
Figure 3 shows the extent of changes in the income replacement rate of the pension benefit 
against the reestimated average lifetime earning during the working period of each 
pensioner in accordance with the amendment to the National Pension Act. As presented in 
Figure 3, the scale of decrease in the income replacement rate caused by the amendment is 
small for workers aged 55 who have a relatively longer subscription period, and the extent of 
decrease grows bigger with future generations. In particular, the income replacement rate of 
those aged 25 decreases by almost 30% in every income class after the amendment to the 
Act, which suggests that its function of serving as an old age income source will be 
weakened over time. 
Of course, the old age income security level of the National Pension Scheme differentiates 
among each income class. In the case of the y/2 group, which is the equivalent of the 
medium-income subscribers of the National Pension, the income replacement rate is 
expected to remain over 40% in the long term even after the amendment to the National 
Pension Act, and it is likely to play an important role of social insurance. Also, its effect of old 
age income security is clearer for the low-income class (y/3), due to its income redistribution 
function. However, in the case of average income earners, the income replacement rate 
after the amendment will remain a little above 30% in the long term, even though they work 
during the entire subscription period. In particular, the income replacement rate of high-
income earners (2y) seems to decrease to around 17% in the long term. 
Figure 3: Change in Income Replacement Rates before and after the Amendment 
a. Workers aged 55 
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b. Workers aged 40   
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That is, although the pension fund serves as an old age income source to a certain extent 
despite the cut in pension benefits, its capacity to provide old age income security seems to 
be weakened for average and higher income earners. Therefore, to complement such a 
function, it will be necessary to discover various sources of old age income for the mid-to-
high-income classes. 
The remarkable decrease in the income replacement rate of high-income earners (2y) in 
Figure 3 is due to the application of the earnings ceiling for the pensionable income and the 
income redistribution effect of the National Pension Scheme. That is, under the current 
scheme, earnings exceeding 3.6 million KRW will be excluded from the objects of both 
contributions and benefits, and therefore, the replacement rate of high income earners, 
whose income levels are higher than the earnings ceiling, will decrease further. However, 
despite the increase in the real income and price level, the upper earnings limit has been 
fixed at its nominal value (3.6 million KRW) for the past 20 years, since the National Pension 
Scheme was first introduced in 1988. For this reason, the present value of the current 
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earnings ceiling is about 120% of the average income level, resulting in restrictions on 
additional opportunities for applying the national pension scheme to a large number of mid-
to-high income earners. In particular, since the role of old age income security for relatively 
higher income earners is likely to be weakened with the benefit cuts, it seems inevitable to 
readjust the earnings ceiling to a more reasonable level and expand the function of social 
insurance. 
4. FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION 
So far, the major contents of the amendment to the National Pension Act implemented in 
July 2007 and its expected effects have been reviewed and assessed in various aspects. 
Overall, the second amendment could be positively assessed, in that it sought a preemptive 
response to the upcoming aged society by considering various measures to stabilize the 
pension finance, to reinforce the vesting rights, and to rationalize the relevant institutions. At 
the same time, however, there are issues that should be additionally resolved and 
complemented from economic and welfare perspectives. In particular, the amendment has 
its limitations when it comes to resolving the structural imbalance of the National Pension 
Scheme, although it has made a remarkable contribution to the sustainability of the pension 
finance and equity of the scheme. Moreover, the huge benefit cuts will inevitably reduce its 
role as old age income security. In this section, policy directions that should be pursued in 
the future will be discussed based on the assessment result of the amendment to the 
National Pension Act. 
4.1 Establishment of a Financial Stabilization Goal 
As observed above, the financial instability and intergenerational inequity problems of the 
National Pension Scheme were caused by the internal structural imbalance between 
contribution and benefit, combined with the external factor of a rapidly aging population. In 
truth, if not for such fast demographical changes, the problem of equity among different 
generations or sustainability caused by differences in pension financing methods such as 
PAYG or a funded system could be markedly alleviated. However, with such drastic changes 
in population structure as are actually occurring in reality, the best alternative to enhance the 
sustainability of the pension finance and intergenerational equity would be maintaining a 
financing method based on the funded system for as long as possible (Moon 2005). 
In the discussion of reform measures to stabilize the finances of the National Pension 
Scheme, top priority must be placed on the clear set-up of the purpose of the reform, which 
is directly related to the matter of social choice about which financing system should be 
applied to the National Pension Scheme. If the government decides to keep the partially 
funded pension scheme in an effort to respond to a rapidly aging population and to secure 
the sustainability of the National Pension Fund, the action plan for the reform will have to be 
prepared in a rational and concrete way to achieve such a goal. In this regard, the contents 
of the amendment to the National Pension Act in 2007 seem to have limitations both in terms 
of policy goal and policy means. 
Despite considerable cuts in pension benefits under the revised act, the innate problem of 
the National Pension Scheme, such as the structural imbalance, was not solved 
fundamentally because the reform measures to improve financial stability have been 
coordinated without any principles or specific financial goals. Moreover, the original financial 
stabilization goal suggested by the NPDC in 2003 has been damaged and reduced during 
the process of political discussions, which is very regretful. Therefore, in future efforts to 
pursue reforms to stabilize the National Pension Scheme’s finances, in-depth discussions 
over which financing method should be maintained or what should be the specific goals to 
achieve financial stabilization are necessary before any attempts are made to adjust pension 
benefit or contribution levels. 
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4.2 Rectification of Structural Imbalance 
As presented above, the structural imbalance of the National Pension Scheme has not been 
fully resolved even after the amendment to the National Pension Act in 2007, which implies 
that the pension finance still contains problems of long-term instability and intergenerational 
inequity in terms of net pension benefits. Therefore, the major task for improving the 
sustainability and equity of the National Pension Scheme will have to be the resolution of this 
fundamental imbalance issue, which requires the readjustment of the current contribution 
and benefit level. The sooner such restructuring occurs, the quicker financial soundness can 
be achieved and the alleviation of the contribution burden of future generations will be 
addressed. 
4.2.1 Contribution Adjustment  
With the amendment to the National Pension Act, the income replacement rate of the 
pension scheme for mid-to-high income earners will fall below 30% level even for pensioners 
with 40 years of coverage. For this reason, there will be limitations on further benefit cuts in 
the future on a uniform basis. Therefore, to come up with additional measures to stabilize the 
pension finance, a top priority will have to be put on raising the level of contribution rate. 
The improvement measures suggested by the government in 2003 focused on maintaining 
the partially funded system by 2070, with a decrease in the income replacement rate by 10% 
(from 60% to 50%) and a gradual increase in the contribution rate to 15.9%. If this financial 
stabilization goal is applied as it is and the income replacement rate is reduced to 40% as 
suggested in the latest revised bill, it is estimated that the contribution rate should be raised 
to 12.9% (NPDC 2003). However, the level of contribution increase does not seem to be 
sufficient to achieve a structural balance of the system in the long-term. 
With such a contribution level, the timing of fund exhaustion might be delayed until 2070. 
After that, however, it will be inevitable to convert to the PAYG system, and the required 
contribution rate to maintain the National Pension Scheme will rise above 24% (refer to 
Table 3). Therefore, the only solution to prevent such a condition would be to maintain the 
partially-funded pension scheme, under which, the higher the funding rate, the lower the 
burden of future generations over contribution payment (Moon 2005). In other words, a 
prompt increase in the current contribution level and a decrease in excessive net pension 
benefits would be a feasible solution to promote the sustainability of the National Pension 
Scheme and to reduce excessive income transfer from next generations to current 
generations. 
The level of increase in contribution rate and the speed of the adjustment should be 
determined based on the specific goals to achieve the financial stability mentioned above. If 
the partially-funded pension scheme should be maintained in the future, the contribution rate 
will also have to be adjusted in accordance with the plan and, in that case, a considerable 
increase in the contribution rate will be inevitable. Figure 4 presents the results of a 
simulation analysis over the extent of changes in the amount of pension reserve, in case the 
contribution rate goes up by 1.0 percentage points every three years from 2010. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, to keep the funding ratio at a stable level from a long-term perspective 
while maintaining the current benefit system, it is estimated that the contribution rate should 
go up to 15% level. If the timing and speed of contribution rate adjustment are delayed and 
slowed down further, the scale of increase in contribution rate will increase more, which will 
require a bolder decision during future reforms. 
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Figure 4: Effect of Increase in the Contribution Level  
(increase of 1.0 percentage points every three years from 2010) 
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4.2.2 Benefit Adjustment 
As pointed out above, without securing other complementary old age income sources in the 
future, it seems difficult to apply additional cuts in the pension benefit level. However, to 
restrict the scale of contribution increase to strike a financial balance for the National 
Pension Scheme, a continuous review will be necessary not only for such a uniform 
decrease in pension benefits but also for the measures to decrease the burden of benefit 
payment. In this context, other alternatives could include: (i) measures to speed up the 
scheduled decrease in the future; and (ii) introduction of a built-in stabilizer that allows 
automatic adjustment of the benefit level reflecting a demographic factor, in response to 
population aging. 
According to the contents of the amendment to the National Pension Act in 2007, the benefit 
level (income replacement rate for insured people with 40-year coverage) will decrease by 
10% (from 60% to 50%) in 2008, and then continue to go down by 0.5 percentage points per 
year from 2009 until it reaches 40% by 2028. This gradual decline in the benefit level has 
been designed to alleviate as much impact as possible from a sudden decrease in pension 
benefits and to have enough time until other measures to secure old age income such as 
private retirement pensions or personal pensions are activated (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 2007). However, if the speed of benefit cuts is too slow, the net pension benefits for 
early generations of the National Pension Scheme will continue to remain, and the financial 
burden of future generations will become heavier. Also, even if a lump sum decrease in 
pension benefits is applied immediately, the actual effect of benefit cuts will appear slowly 
due to the grandfathering measure. Considering this, a decision to gradually decrease the 
pension benefits over the next 20 years seems to have reflected the relevant political 
interests, focusing only on the benefit to present generations. Therefore, it is critical to come 
up with measures to accelerate the speed of downward adjustment of the benefit level as 
much as possible, in the process of drawing up additional financial stabilization measures in 
the future. 
One of the alternatives worth considering instead of decreasing pension benefits might be 
the introduction of an automatic balance mechanism recently adopted and implemented in 
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some advanced countries including Sweden, Germany, and Japan.9 All of these countries 
have introduced the automatic balance mechanism, which allows automatic downward 
adjustments of the benefit level reflecting the speed of extension in people’s life expectancy, 
in an effort to overcome the financial crisis of their public pension systems caused by rapid 
population aging. This mechanism not only alleviates the pressure of further contribution 
increases or financial instability caused by longer life spans, but also contributes to the 
improvement of intergenerational equity through actuarial adjustments of pension benefits, 
reflecting a demographic variable in accordance with the increase in life expectancy. In 
particular, considering the fact that Korea is facing a serious problem of population aging 
that is progressing at an unprecedented speed, it seems desirable to think more actively 
about the introduction of an automatic balance mechanism. 
4.3 Efficient Management of the Pension Fund  
In operating a partially-funded pension system such as the National Pension Scheme, the 
efficiency of pension reserve management plays a critical role in maintaining the financial 
soundness of the system. Under the Defined Benefit System, the amount of benefit payment 
calculated through a pension formula is funded by the pension contributions collected from 
pensioners and investment profits of the pension fund. As a result, the lower the rate of 
return on the pension fund, the higher the pressure of increase in the contribution level. 
Therefore, the imbalanced structure of the National Pension Scheme is closely related to the 
pension fund’s rate of return. In addition, since the funding rate of the national pension is 
expected to increase considerably with the amendment to the Act (see Table 3), the 
enhancement of the profitability of the pension fund management has become relatively 
more important. 
The impact of the improvement in the rate of return on pension finance has been more 
clearly exposed in Figure 5, which demonstrates the simulation result. As observed in Figure 
5, if the real rate of return on the pension fund increases by 0.5 percentage points every year 
compared to the presumed real interest rate, the exhaustion of the National Pension Fund is 
likely to be postponed by more than five years. If the gap between real rate of return and real 
interest is widened to 1.0 percentage points per year, the partially funded pension scheme 
will possibly be maintained by 2070 without additional adjustments over the pension benefit 
or contribution levels under the current system. 
As such, not only will the enhancement of the pension fund’s rate of return play a pivotal role 
in promoting the sustainability of the pension finance but also it will have a huge impact on 
determining the contribution rate for future generations. To assess the impact of changes in 
fund investment profitability on the contribution burden of future generations in a more 
quantitative way, a simulation analysis has been conducted to find out how much increase 
from the current contribution rate (9%) is necessary to generate the similar financial effect 
caused by the changes in the real rate of return on the pension fund presented in Figure 5. 
                                                
9 Refer to Kim (2007) for the review on the specific measures to introduce automatic balance mechanism. 
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Figure 5: Changes in the Amount of Fund Reserve with Different Rate of Return 
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As presented in Figure 6, a 0.5 percentage point increase in the rate of return on the pension 
fund is expected to generate the same effect as the rise in contribution rate by 0.9 
percentage points, while a 1.0 percentage point increase in the rate of return is likely to have 
the same effect as the gain in the contribution rate by 2.3 percentage points. This implies 
that the efficient operation of the fund reserves will be critical for the successful maintenance 
of the partially-funded pension scheme, since the enhancement in the pension fund’s rate of 
return will considerably ease the burden of contribution rates for future generations. 
Figure 6: Changes in the Amount of Fund Reserve with Different Contribution Rates 
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Note: In Scenario 1, the contribution rate is fixed at 9.9% after 2010. In Scenario 2, the contribution rates are: 2010–
2012: 9.5%, 2013–2015: 10%, 2016–2018: 10.5%, 2019–2021: 11%, 2022-2070: 11.3% 
Table 5 demonstrates the result of a performance comparison between Korea’s National 
Pension Fund and 10 other countries’ public pension funds from 2000 to 2006. In this 
international comparison, Korea ranks above the medium level in terms of average rate of 
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return on the national pension fund, showing a stabilized pattern. Although the national 
pension fund has been managed with an emphasis on its stability as revealed in Table 5, it is 
also positively assessed in terms of profitability. However, if only 3-year (2004–2006) 
average performance values are compared, the rate of return on Korea’s National Pension 
Fund is a mere half the profitability levels of the public pensions in other countries. This is 
because Korea’s National Pension Fund has kept a conservative attitude in pension fund 
management, mainly focusing its investment on bonds. The safety-based investment 
distribution principle can serve as an obstacle to a more flexible adjustment of strategic 
asset allocations in response to the changes in the investment environment such as 
continuous decrease in interest rates after the financial crisis and stock market recovery. 
Table 5: Performance Comparison between the National Pension Fund and the 
Pension Funds in Other Countries 
(Unit: %) 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
3-year 
Average 
(2004–
2006) 
6-year 
Average 
(2001–
2006) 
Korea 
 
4.93* 
(5.77)* 
9.55 
(5.61)
5.69 
(8.07)
7.83
 
6.35
 
8.99
 
6.72 
 
7.40 
 
Sweden (AP1) 9.8 17.5 11.4 16.5 -13.8 -5.6 12.90 5.97 
US (CalPERS) 15.7 11.1 13.4 23.3 -9.5 -6.2 13.40 7.97 
Canada (CPP) 15.5 8.50 17.6 -1.5 4.0 7.0 13.87 8.52 
Canada (QPP) 14.6 14.7 12.2 15.2 -9.6 -4.99 13.83 7.02 
Netherlands 9.5 12.8 11.5 11 -7.2 -0.7 11.27 6.15 
Ireland 12.4 19.6 9.3 12.8 -16.1 3.3 13.77 6.88 
Japan - 14.37 4.43 13.01 -8.63 -2.65 7.28 3.93 
Source: Moon et al. (2007) 
* Korea’s rates of return on pension fund are based on their book values. Values in parentheses are market values.  
Discussions over specific measures to enhance the efficiency of the National Pension Fund 
management will not be addressed here since they are not in the scope of this study.10 
However, in Moon et al. (2007), various issues related to the pension fund management 
system have been discussed. Based on this, measures to strengthen the expertise, 
independency, and accountability of the fund’s management have been suggested. The 
improvement measures include the establishment of the “National Pension Fund 
Management Corporation” which is independent from government departments and the 
political circle, and imposition of independent roles to determine the investment policy on the 
newly established “Pension Fund Management Committee” which is composed of experts in 
the private sector. If fiduciary duties including the enhancement of profitability and safety of 
the National Pension Fund management can be reinforced through this effort to advance the 
fund management system, it will contribute considerably to promote the financial soundness 
and alleviate the contribution burden of the current National Pension Scheme. 
                                                
10 For more discussion about the impact of the National Pension Scheme on the financial market, its asset 
allocation structure, fund management system, and execution of shareholders’ rights, see Moon (ed.) (2007). 
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4.4 Expansion of Opportunities to Secure Old Age Income 
4.4.1 Adjustment of the Earnings Ceiling  
As reviewed in the adequacy assessment, the amendment to the National Pension Act is 
expected to cause a decrease in the income replacement rate of the average income 
earners with 40-year coverage to 30% level in the long-term segment and that of high-
income earners to below 20%. The reason behind this huge decline is the unreasonably low 
ceiling of earnings where the National Pension Scheme is applied. That is, the upper 
earnings limit determined at the time when the Nation Pension System was introduced has 
been fixed at its nominal value of 3.6 million KRW for the past 20 years, which led to the 
decrease in the earnings ceiling to 120% level of the average income today. As a result, a 
large number of workers have been restricted by this earnings ceiling, causing a huge loss in 
opportunities to attract additional earnings coverage. 
Therefore, it seems urgent to expand the range of pensionable income, by raising the 
earnings ceiling to reflect income growth in the past 20 years. In the case of the US’ Social 
Security System, the earnings ceiling is US$87,900 per year as of 2004, which is 290% of 
the average earnings (OECD 2007). Also, a constant ratio against which the average income 
level has been maintained with upward adjustments of this earnings ceiling, indexed with the 
average income growth rate of the whole society every year. It seems necessary for Korea 
to introduce such a system of linking the income growth rate with the level of earnings ceiling 
for the National Pension Scheme. By doing so, the social security function of the National 
Pension Scheme will have to be enhanced especially for the middle- and higher-income 
classes. 
4.4.2 Activation of Other Sources of Old Age Income 
Advanced multilayer old age income security systems are composed of public pensions at 
the national level, retirement pensions at the company level, and personal pensions and 
savings for old age at the individual level. Since the benefit cuts under the revised National 
Pension Act would lead to the contraction of the old age income security function of the 
National Pension Fund, it is necessary to actively vitalize the private pension market. In 
Korea, the “nominal” foundation for the multilayered old age income security system was laid 
with the introduction of the personal pension system in 1994 and the implementation of the 
retirement pension system in 2005. However, the function of the private pension market has 
not been actively vitalized until today, 11   resulting from various issues such as lack of 
incentives for pension subscription including tax benefits, insufficient means to protect 
subscribers, incomplete and imprudent regulations, and inadequate guarantee of portability 
(Ryu 2007). Therefore, it will be a very important policy task to rapidly activate the private 
pension market by alleviating such restrictions. 
Another possible solution could be the vitalization of the recently introduced reverse 
mortgage market. This reverse mortgage system might be able to complement the general 
pension system since it can serve as a constant old age income source after retirement 
without concerns over securing housing finance. The activation of this reverse mortgage 
system will be very useful especially in Korea as an additional old age income source, 
considering the fact that over 80% of total assets possessed by people aged 60 and older 
are in real estate, and 70% of the elderly have their own houses (Park 2004). Because it is 
just in its initial stage, the reverse mortgage system is not yet widely recognized by people 
and the scope of houses to which this system can be applied is also limited. However, if 
actively promoted, the reverse mortgage system is likely to play an important role in the 
multilayer old age income security system targeting mid-to-high income classes. 
                                                
11 As of September 2007, only 4.58% of the companies targeted by the retirement pension scheme have actually 
subscribed to the scheme. Also, it is pointed out that the personal pension system is not living up to its role 
because of a recent drop in household subscription rate (Ryu 2007). 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study focused on the quantitative assessment of the impact of the second amendment 
to the National Pension Act passed in July 2007 on the sustainability, equity, and adequacy 
of the National Pension Scheme. The assessment was based on simulation analyses and 
policy implications that can be applied for the development of the system in the future. 
Overall, the revision of the act can be positively assessed in light of its preemptive response 
to the country’s rapidly aging society through measures to stabilize the pension finance, 
strengthen the rights of the stakeholders, and to rationalize the National Pension Scheme. 
However, there are certain additional tasks to complement the scheme from both the 
economic and welfare perspectives. The results of major analyses used in the assessment 
process of the revision of the National Pension Act and future policy tasks drawn by the 
analysis results can be summarized as follows. 
First, despite the huge benefit cuts, we have assessed the reform of the National Pension 
Scheme as an insufficient measure for striking a long-term balance of the pension finance. 
This is mainly because the basic principles of the financial stabilization measures were 
marred in the process of political compromise. Therefore, it is important to exclude political 
logic as much as possible and to come up with more reasonable measures to stabilize the 
pension finance by setting clearer and more specific goals for fund management and 
financial stabilization. To this end, it is necessary to draw up such plans as shortening the 
adjustment period for benefit cuts, while introducing the automatic balance mechanism to 
reflect the increase in life expectancy, together with a gradual increase in contribution rates. 
These measures will contribute not only to the stabilization of the pension finance but also to 
the enhancement of intergenerational equity. 
Secondly, the results of simulation analyses suggest that the improvement of the Pension 
Fund’s rate of return by 0.5 percentage points per year can delay the timing of fund 
exhaustion by more than five years. This suggests that the enhancement of profitability and 
stability through an effort to advance the pension fund management system is a very 
important policy task. Also, non-systemic policy measures such as a plan to increase 
birthrates or to provide incentives for the elderly to participate in income-generating activities 
can make indirect contributions to the stabilization of national pension finance. 
Lastly, we note that the role of the National Pension Scheme as an old age income source 
will be reduced in the long term with the amendment to the National Pension Act, which 
requires an effort to secure various other old age income sources. To this end, it is urgent to 
expand the range of pensionable incomes through an upward adjustment of the current 
earnings ceiling which has been fixed for the last 20 years at its nominal value of 3.6 million 
KRW. It is also important to introduce a method to link this increase with the income growth 
rate. To promote retirement pension products at the company level and to activate the 
private personal pension market, a more advanced multilayer old age income security 
system should be established through system reinforcement and support measures. Also, 
the strengthening of the recently introduced reverse mortgage system could be an effective 
complementary measure, given the fact that 80% of the total assets possessed by the 
elderly population in Korea are in the form of real estate. 
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